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A Comparison of Organizational, Structural, 
and Relationship Effects on Subordinates’ 
Upward Influence Choices 
 
 
Kathleen J. Krone 
 
Abstract 
This research examined the extent to which organizational membership, centralization of authority, 
and subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory relationship quality affected how frequently they re-
port using different types of tactics in their upward influence attempts. Participants from five differ-
ent organizations were surveyed. A typology of upward influence tactics was created based on the 
extent to which: (1) the means employed to attempt influence are open or closed, and (2) the desired 
outcomes are openly expressed or left undisclosed. The resulting dependent variable consisted of 
three types of tactics: open upward influence, strategic upward influence, and political upward in-
fluence. MANOVA results indicated that while organizational membership, centralization of authority, 
and leader-member exchange all significantly affect upward influence tactic choices, organizational 
membership explains more variance than do the other two independent variables. 
 
Keywords: organizational membership, participation in decision making, leader-member exchange, 
upward influence 
 
Arguing for work-related opinions and subordinating one’s thoughts to those of cowork-
ers are universal experiences in organizational life. Knowledge about when and how to 
attempt organizational influence is most likely acquired through a variety of socialization 
experiences and is important to individuals and organizations alike. From the individual’s 
point of view, ineffective upward influence can result in perceptions of reduced personal 
control and increased work-related stress (e.g., Karasek, 1979). From the organization’s 
perspective, subordinates’ unwillingness or inability to influence a supervisor’s thinking 
can reduce organizational effectiveness, increase gaps between organizational practices 
and publicly stated goals (Mechanic, 1962; Weinstein, 1979) and even reduce an organiza-
tion’s ability to avert disaster (e.g., Feynman, 1988). 
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Over time, individuals may learn to employ some general set of influence tactics across 
all interpersonal and organizational situations. However, through organizational sociali-
zation processes individuals most likely learn to adjust their preferred means of attempt-
ing influence to match those that are more likely to be effective in their current work 
relationships and larger work settings. Organizational and relationship characteristics can 
shape upward influence choices to the extent that they make available certain tactics and 
affect whether these tactics will be judged appropriate and effective (Krone & Ludlum, 
1990). Given the necessity of social influence to organizations and their members, both can 
benefit by knowing more about how organizational and relationship factors condition sub-
ordinates’ influence tactic choices. This research examines the extent to which previously 
untested yet pervasive features of working life—organizational membership, perceptions 
of centralization of authority and leader-member exchange, affect subordinates’ selection 
of upward influence tactics. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Upward Influence 
Studies that compare upward, lateral and downward tactic choices reveal that while indi-
viduals in general report using rationality tactics most frequently, the direction of the in-
fluence attempt affects additional tactic choices (Erez, Rim & Keider, 1986; Kipnis, Schmidt 
& Wilkinson, 1980). Specifically, managers are less likely to employ “assertiveness” with 
superiors than with co-workers, less likely to employ “sanctions” with superiors or co-
workers than with subordinates, and less likely to employ “exchange” with superiors than 
with co-workers. In addition, researchers have successfully identified several personal and 
situational characteristics that affect subordinates’ upward influence activity. At least two 
personal characteristics—locus of control and needs for power and achievement—affect 
subordinates’ upward influence tactic choices. Those with an internal locus of control are 
more likely to select praising tactics, while “externals” are more likely to choose coercive 
tactics (Lamude, Daniels & White, 1987). School principals who score higher on both needs 
for power and achievement also are more active in attempting upward influence (Mow-
day, 1978). With respect to situational characteristics, studies conducted with students in 
hypothetical situations indicate that decreased power among subordinates is accompanied 
by an increased tendency to employ some forms of ingratiation (Michener, Plazewski & 
Vaske, 1979) and to use “politeness” strategies (Baxter, 1984). Additional research suggests 
that the larger organizational context might affect subordinates’ upward influence at-
tempts as well (Cheng, 1983). When presented with a positive/rational scenario or a nega-
tive/political one, employees reported that they were more likely to use “rational” appeals 
in the rational context, and more likely to use ingratiation, threat and blocking tactics in 
the political one. 
Thus, existing research suggests that upward influence tactic choices are somewhat dif-
ferent from those reported in other directions, and that certain characteristics of subordi-
nates and situations appear to affect these choices. Comparatively little is known about 
how characteristics of work relationships and macro features of organizations might affect 
subordinates’ upward influence choices. 
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An attempt to fill gaps in what is known about upward influence in organizations is 
complicated by considerable disagreement on how upward influence should be conceptu-
alized and measured (see Schilit & Locke, 1982). Many researchers have used the Kipnis, 
Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) checklist, or checklists derived from the Marwell and 
Schmitt (1967) typology, while others have developed coding systems based on politeness 
theory (Baxter, 1984). The present paper argues that there may be something unique about 
upward influence that is only partially captured by existing conceptual frameworks. Up-
ward influence attempts are motivated by a desire for some alternative condition or course 
of action than what presently exists in an organization (e.g., Weinstein, 1979). Subordinates 
may express their desires for change openly. However, because supervisors typically have 
the authority to formally evaluate subordinate performance (e.g., Athanassiades, 1973; Cohen, 
1958), subordinates learn to pursue their desired outcomes in edited and self-protective 
ways. Indeed, research has consistently demonstrated marked “distortion” in upward 
communication (e.g., Campbell, 1958; O’Reilly & Roberts, 1974). Thus, any framework for 
organizing upward influence tactics should consider: (1) the subordinates’ desired out-
comes and whether or not these are explicitly stated, and (2) the means employed to send 
upward influence messages, and the explicitness with which they are sent. 
In addition, existing conceptualizations of upward influence exclusively adopt a mes-
sage sender orientation. This potentially masks the importance of message reception be-
haviors in attempting upward influence. Subordinates who listen simply to understand 
their supervisors’ point of view may glean different kinds of information than do subordi-
nates who listen to analyze and judge their supervisors’ opinions (Kelly, 1974). This study 
attempts to conceptualize and measure upward influence more comprehensively by in-
cluding a range of subordinate listening behaviors. 
 
Upward Influence Model and Tactics 
The measure of upward influence proposed in this paper tests an extended model of po-
litical behavior in organizations (Porter, Allen & Angle, 1981), and addresses the concerns 
mentioned previously. The model assumes that subordinates may be more or less open in 
their attempts to influence supervisors and more or less open in stating their desired out-
comes. The proposed typology clusters existing influence tactics according to whether each 
makes obvious or leaves obscure both the means of attempting influence and the desired 
outcome. In addition, the model has been extended to incorporate a range of listening be-
haviors subordinates might use in the course of attempting upward influence. Since the 
present research focuses on subordinate attempts to influence their supervisors in face-to-
face conversations, tactics involving co-worker communication (e.g., coalition formation) 
have been excluded from the study. 
 
Tactics I: Open Upward Influence 
When subordinates use open upward influence, their influence attempts are overt and 
their desired outcomes are fully disclosed. With the use of open upward influence, subor-
dinates may listen empathically, openly argue for some desired course of action, give rea-
sons, and/or provide factual support for their point of view. To some extent, these are 
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information-based tactics which involve collecting and using information to support an 
explicitly stated desired decision outcome. 
 
Tactics II: Strategic Upward Influence 
Strategic upward influence is characterized either by the use of obvious means of attempt-
ing influence but undisclosed desired outcomes or the use of covert means of influence but 
openly expressed desired outcomes. With the use of strategic upward influence, subordi-
nates are partially open/obvious as they verbally pursue a desired course of action. Com-
pared to open upward influence, strategic tactics are less explicit and direct. 
Influence attempts with open means and closed ends include the use of foot-in-the door 
and door-in-the-face techniques, both of which involve manipulating the size of an initial 
request. Foot-in-the-door techniques involve asking for less than what is actually wanted, 
and hoping to get more later. Door-in-the-face techniques involve initially asking for more 
than what is actually desired. The inflated request is then followed by the actual request 
which presumably gives subordinates the appearance of making reasonable concessions 
(see Dillard, Hunter & Burgoon, 1984). Thus, when subordinates use strategic upward in-
fluence, the attempt to influence is obvious, yet a preferred decision outcome is not explicitly 
stated. In listening strategically, subordinates may listen carefully to what their supervi-
sors say. But rather than listening simply to understand what their supervisors mean, 
subordinates listen to find flaws in their supervisors’ thinking or to incorporate their su-
pervisors’ perspective in subsequent influence attempts. 
Strategic upward influence attempts with closed means and open ends include manip-
ulating the use of information, managing one’s self-presentation and using ingratiation 
behaviors during the course of pursuing an explicitly stated decision outcome. Subordi-
nates who intentionally manage information may: (1) positively distort upward commu-
nication (O’Reilly & Roberts, 1974; Rosen & Tesser, 1970); (2) tell supervisors what they 
think their supervisors want to hear (Campbell, 1958); (3) withhold information from their 
supervisors (Read, 1962; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974), and/or (4) overwhelm their supervisors 
with information (Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick & Mayes, 1979). Self-presentation re-
fers to the use of impression management techniques with which subordinates project cer-
tain features of themselves that they would like their supervisors to assimilate (Goffman, 
1959). In organizations, this may involve behavior such as pointing out previous personal 
accomplishments to create and maintain the impression of competency and loyalty (Allen 
et al., 1979). 
Ingratiation behaviors are employed to enhance one’s interpersonal attractiveness 
(Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). For example, subordinates may emphasize what they 
have in common with their supervisors and deemphasize their differences. This can be a 
particularly effective influence method since research suggests that: (1) perceived similar-
ity between interactants is positively associated with increased interpersonal influence 
(Byrne, 1969; Falcione, McCroskey & Daly, 1977), and (2) in highly uncertain decision sit-
uations, social comparison with similar others may often be used to stabilize opinions and 
guide action (Pfeffer, Salancik & Leblebici, 1976). Ingratiation also includes other-enhancement 
behaviors such as acting humbly while in the presence of supervisors and making a point 
of complimenting them (Allen et al., 1979; Kipnis et al., 1980). 
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Tactics III: Political Upward Influence 
More than either of the previous types of tactics, the use of political upward influence in-
volves disguising the attempt to exercise influence. Political tactics are comparatively more 
deceptive than strategic ones since their use includes obscuring from one’s supervisor both 
the means of influence and the desired outcomes. For example, subordinates may deliber-
ately establish and sustain a false image, discuss mistakes of co-workers, or distort infor-
mation presented to their supervisors. The use of these tactics is unattached to a specific 
decision outcome. Subordinates listen “politically” when they do things to encourage their 
supervisors to continue talking, even though they may not be listening to what their su-
pervisors are saying. 
 
Organizational Membership and Upward Influence 
While previous research has not examined the relationship between organizational mem-
bership and subordinates’ selection of upward influence strategies, it seems possible that 
within a particular organization, some types of influence would be considered more ap-
propriate and effective than others. Current theorizing suggests that certain types of peo-
ple are attracted to and decide to remain in particular organizations, and that over time, 
the people come to define the organization’s climate and culture (Schneider, 1987). Others 
are suggesting that because of structuration processes, there may be something unique 
about any given organization (e.g., Poole, 1988). To examine the possibility that organiza-
tional membership might affect subordinates’ selection of influence strategies, the follow-
ing research question is posed: 
 
Research Question 1: To what extent does organizational membership affect 
subordinates’ selection of open, strategic or political up-
ward influence tactics? 
 
Centralization of Authority and Upward Influence 
Considered by some to be the most significant of all structuring characteristics (Barnard, 
1938; Simon, 1957), centralization refers to the dispersion of decision-making authority 
throughout an organization (Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding & Porter, 1980). In order-
ing decision-making processes, centralization affects the overall frequency of communica-
tion in organizations (Hage & Aiken, 1969; Hage, Aiken & Marrett, 1971). As perceptions 
of decentralization increase, research consistently reveals an increase in the overall amount 
of superior-subordinate communication. Specifically, as decentralization increases, so does 
the amount of unplanned, task-related communication between employees and their su-
pervisors, and between supervisors and their managers (Hage, Aiken & Marrett, 1971). 
Previous research does not examine how centralization might affect subordinates’ selec-
tion of specific types of upward influence with their supervisors. 
Research does suggest however, that under decentralized conditions, subordinates are 
more willing to disclose important and even personally threatening information to their 
supervisors (Young, 1978), and that in high vs. low participatory work groups individuals 
report an increased willingness to interact (Harrison, 1985). Based on the results of availa-
ble research, the following hypothesis is advanced: 
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H1: Subordinates’ perceptions of participation in decision making will signifi-
cantly affect their selection of open, strategic and political upward influ-
ence tactics. 
 
Leader-Member Exchange and Upward Influence 
The concept of leader-member exchange emerged from the organizational role-making 
perspective (Graen, 1976) and represents a way to characterize the quality of a supervisory 
relationship. Theoretically, subordinates in leadership exchanges (i.e., in-group subordi-
nates) exercise comparatively more influence in the role-making process than do subordi-
nates in supervisory exchanges (i.e., out-group relationships) (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; 
Graen, 1976). Generally, in-group relationships are characterized by mutual influence pro-
cesses between supervisors and their subordinates. Within out-group relationships, the 
exercise of influence appears to be more unidirectional and downward. Communication 
research is beginning to reveal important differences in how everyday “talk” occurs within 
leader-member relationships of varying quality. Managers are more conversationally 
dominant with out-group subordinates than they are with in-group ones (Fairhurst, Rog-
ers & Sarr, 1987), and mutual persuasion seems to be more characteristic of in-group rela-
tionships than of out-group ones (Fairhurst & Chandler, 1989). To date, no research has 
examined the specific types of upward influence tactics in-group and out-group subordi-
nates select in attempting to influence their supervisors’ thinking. Based on currently avail-
able research, the following hypothesis is advanced: 
 
H2: Subordinates’ perceptions of leader-member exchange will affect their se-
lection of open, strategic or political upward influence tactics. 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Setting 
 
Organizations 
Five organizations agreed to participate in this research. All organizations were located in 
a large metropolitan area in the southwest and ranged in size from 100 hundred employees 
to several thousand. Organization #1 develops, markets, and trains clients in the use of 
computer software designed specifically for use within finance-related companies. This 
organization is fairly young and has grown rapidly in recent years. Data were collected 
from the system research division of this company where software is developed and doc-
umented. Organization #2, a Fortune 500 company, develops and manufactures aerospace 
technology and equipment. Data were collected from the operations division where equip-
ment is assembled according to government specifications and the written instructions of 
manufacturing engineers. Organization #3 is an administrative office of a large state hu-
man service organization. The majority of participants from this organization were mem-
bers of newly formed “quality circles” which had been in operation for several weeks. 
Respondents represented five different administrative departments within the state office. 
Organization #4 is a life insurance company. Participants from this organization interpret 
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policy, work with agents and process claims on a daily basis. Organization #5 is a large, 
diversified public utility company. Data were collected from employees in their lignite coal 
plant, a field operations and maintenance unit, and the central administration office. 
 
Respondents 
Each of the 411 participants in this research had a supervisor to whom s/he reported. Ap-
proximately 53% of the respondents were male, with a little over 75% falling between the 
ages of 20 and 39. Only 5% of the participants had not finished high school, a little over 
half had completed high school, almost a third held undergraduate degrees, and 6% had 
earned graduate college degrees. About one-fifth of the sample reported having been em-
ployed with their organization for one year or less, 40% for two to five years, 20% for six 
to ten years and 17% for eleven years or more. Approximately 46% of the participants per-
ceived themselves to be in the lowest levels of their organization’s formal hierarchy, while 
only 1% located themselves at the highest level in their organization. 
 
Data Collection Procedures 
Prior to data collection, the researcher asked a liaison in each organization to inform em-
ployees that they would be participating in a study concerning how people communicate 
during organizational decision making. At that time, participants also were informed of 
when and where data would be collected, that their participation in the study was volun-
tary and that results would be reported in a manner that protected their anonymity. The 
researcher repeated the latter two points at the time of data collection. Participants also 
were informed of the option to leave a particular item blank if they felt that by responding 
their identity would be revealed. Finally, participants were informed that they would have 
access to the final summary report that their organization would receive once the research 
was completed. Data were typically collected in a conference room within each organiza-
tion with groups of respondents scheduled at 45-minute intervals. The organizational liai-
sons were asked to schedule subordinates and their supervisors in separate response 
groups. 
 
Data Gathering Instruments 
One questionnaire was prepared and used to collect data for this study. The questionnaire 
included: the Index of Actual Participation, the Leader-Member Exchange Scale, and three 
upward-influence scales constructed specifically for use in this study. 
An adapted version of the Index of Actual Participation (Hage & Aiken, 1967) measured 
workers’ perceptions of the extent to which they participated in administrative and policy 
decisions in their organizations. This scale consists of four items that participants re-
sponded to on a series of five-point scales using “never” to “always” as anchors. Since the 
Index of Actual Participation was designed initially for use within social service organiza-
tions, items from the original scale were slightly reworded to be equally relevant to busi-
ness and industrial settings. For example, instead of asking respondents about the extent 
to which they participated in decisions to adopt new programs, they were asked to indicate 
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the extent to which they participated in decisions to adopt new products/programs. A re-
liability analysis conducted on this slightly revised version of the Index of Actual Partici-
pation indicated that it was internally consistent (alpha = .90). 
The Leader-Member Exchange Scale (Craen, Liden & Hoel, 1982) was used to measure 
subordinates’ perceptions of the quality of their supervisory relationship. This scale is com-
posed of five items that participants responded to on a series of four-point scales. A relia-
bility analysis suggests that the scale is sufficiently reliable (alpha = .76). 
The measures of upward influence were designed to test the expanded model of polit-
ical communication described earlier. Three scales were constructed based on a review of 
the upward influence literature and research related to the use of persuasive appeals in a 
variety of interpersonal situations. These scales were designed to assess: (1) open upward 
influence (tactics with open means/open ends), (2) strategic upward influence (tactics with 
open means/closed ends or with closed means/open ends), and (3) political upward influ-
ence (tactics with closed means/closed ends). All three scales measured message selection 
frequency using a five-point Likert response format ranging from “Never” (1) to “Always” (5) 
as anchors. 
A pilot study was conducted in which all three scales were administered to 165 under-
graduate students enrolled in communication courses at a large university in the south-
west. A factor analysis (principal components-varimax rotation) of responses resulted in a 
multiple factor solution which was difficult to interpret. Consequently, a decision was 
made to retain items whose factor loadings were at least .60 on one factor and no more 
than .40 on any other factor. In addition, single-item factors were excluded. A second factor 
analysis (principal components-varimax rotation) of this attenuated pool of items resulted 
in a four-factor solution which accounted for 56% of the total item variance. 
The second phase of scale development consisted of attempts to improve the technical 
character of the original items and to construct new items that further tapped the concep-
tual characteristics of open upward influence, strategic upward influence and political up-
ward influence. These revised scales were administered to the participants in the present 
research. Sixteen items measured open upward influence, fifteen measured strategic up-
ward influence and thirteen measured political upward influence. A factor analysis of the 
open upward influence scale resulted in a nine item, one-factor solution which explained 
44% of the total item variance. A factor analysis of the political upward influence scale 
resulted in a ten-item, one-factor solution which accounted for 37% of the total item vari-
ance. A factor analysis of the Strategic Upward Influence scale, however, yielded a two-
factor solution. The first factor (Strategic Upward Influence A) contained seven items and 
accounted for 29% of the variance, while the second factor (Strategic Upward Influence B) 
contained five items and explained 11% of the variance. The first scale consisted of items 
designed to measure open means and closed ends (e.g., manipulating the size of an initial 
request), as well as items designed to measure closed means and open ends (e.g., ingratia-
tion techniques, selective information sharing). The second scale contained items designed 
to measure closed means and open ends, but in addition, three of the five items appear to 
involve the ability to assume the perspective of the supervisor (e.g., stressing common 
opinions, arguing for ideas in terms of what is important to the supervisor). (See Table 1 
for a listing of scale items and factor scores.) 
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Table 1. Upward Influence Scale Items and Factor Scores 
Items Factor Scores 
Open Upward Influence (9 items formed one factor, explaining 44% of the variance) 
Explain my reasons for my point of view. .72 
Make a careful presentation of my idea. .67 
Use logic to convince my supervisor of the worth of my ideas. .77 
Listen carefully to what my supervisor says and ask him/her to explain points I don’t under-
stand. 
.53 
Schedule a meeting to tell my supervisor what I think. .62 
Say what I think in a direct and straightforward manner. .66 
Make my argument more than once, but not so often that my supervisor sees me as a nuisance. .52 
Offer my supervisor access to information I've collected that supports my point of view. .74 
Openly express my thoughts to my supervisor. .69 
Strategic Upward Influence-A (7 items formed the first factor, explaining 29% of the variance) 
Ask for less than what I really want, hoping to get more later. .42 
Use different words than I normally would in everyday conversations with my co-workers. .42 
Compliment my supervisor before saying what I think. .53 
Leave out information that would weaken my position. .66 
Avoid saying exactly what I think, but try to get what I want in other ways. .72 
Say things to get my supervisor to feel good about me even though I am displeased with 
what s/he thinks. 
.71 
Ask for more than is necessary, hoping to come closer to getting what I want. .58 
Strategic Upward Influence-B (5 items formed the second factor, explaining 11% of the variance) 
Discuss things I have in common with my supervisor. .42 
Argue for my idea in terms of what I know is important to my supervisor. .64 
Mention possible problems associated with my idea, but point out how its benefits out-
weigh its costs. 
.77 
Listen for inconsistencies in my supervisor’s point of view. .56 
Stress the ways in which my point of view is similar to my supervisor’s. .69 
Political Upward Influence (10 items formed one factor, explaining 37% of the variance) 
Do things to encourage my supervisor to go on talking even though I’m not listening to 
him/her. 
.53 
Say things that may not be true if it will make my supervisor feel good about me. .66 
Say things I know my supervisor agrees with even if I don’t believe them myself. .61 
Fake knowing more than I do. .63 
Encourage my supervisor to tell me things about himself/herself that I’d be reluctant to tell 
about myself. 
.57 
Discuss mistakes of co-workers hoping to make myself look better. .64 
Maneuver behind my supervisor’s back to get what I want. .53 
Discuss my reputation in the organization for being well-liked, loyal and honest, even if 
that is not the case. 
.56 
Take credit for others’ ideas. .66 
Manipulate my supervisor into going along with my idea. .62 
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A reliability analysis conducted on each of the four scales indicated that two of the 
scales were internally consistent (alpha = .84 for the Open Upward Influence scale, .81 for 
the Political Upward Influence scale). Both of the strategic upward influence scales ap-
proached acceptable levels of reliability (alpha = .71 for strategic upward influence-a, .65 
for strategic upward influence-b). 
 
Data Analysis 
Prior to examining the hypotheses and research question, two levels of centralization and 
leader-member exchange were formed by computing median splits for data secured from 
the Index of Actual Participation (median = 8.07, sd = 4.58), and the Leader-Member Ex-
change Scale (median = 14.51, sd = 3.11). Using this procedure, participants were assigned 
to a high or low pdm group and a supervisory in-group or out-group. Because of a consid-
erable degree of collinearity between the four influence measures (median r is approxi-
mately .39), a multivariate statistical procedure (MANOVA) was used to explore the 
hypotheses and research question. When necessary, significant multivariate effects were 
probed through the use of ANOVA procedures and Newman-Keuls multiple comparison 
tests. 
 
Results 
 
Research question one asked to what extent organizational membership affected subordi-
nates’ upward influence choices. While there were no significant multivariate interaction 
effects, results of the MANOVA analysis revealed a significant multivariate main effect for 
organizational membership (Mult. F = 3.23, df = 16,935, p < .000, R2 = .15). Examination of 
the univariate ANOVA results revealed main effects for all four tactic types: open upward 
influence (F = 8.21, df = 4,347, p < .00, eta2 = .08), strategic upward influence-A (F = 5.87, df 
= 4,346, p < .00, eta2 = .06), strategic upward influence-B (F = 12.85, df = 4,344, p < -00, eta2 = 
.13) and political upward influence (F = 4.95, df = 4,350, p < .00, eta2 = .05). As the means in 
Table 2 suggest and post hoc Newman-Keuls multiple comparison tests confirmed, those 
individuals in organization 1 used significantly more open upward influence than did 
those in organizations 2, 3, and 5, and those individuals in organization 4 used significantly 
more open upward influence than did those in organization 2. Those individuals in organ-
izations 1, 3, and 5 used significantly more strategic upward influence-A than did those in 
organization 2. Those individuals in organization 1 used significantly more strategic up-
ward influence-B than did those in any of the four remaining organizations, and those in 
organization 5 used significantly more strategic upward influence-B than did those in or-
ganization 2. Those in organizations 1 and 5 used significantly more political upward in-
fluence than did those in organizations 2 and 4. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Use of Upward Influence Message Types by Organizational Membership 
 OrganizationA 
 One  Two  Three  Four  Five 
Message Type Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n) 
Open Upward 
Influence 34.90 4.05 87  30.46 7.34 69  32.00 6.80 37  33.29 5.29 52  31.02 5.77 92 
Strategic Upward 
Influence-A 14.77 3.95 87  11.87 4.32 69  14.08 3.78 37  13.02 3.71 52  13.98 3.66 92 
Strategic Upward 
Influence-B 16.31 2.91 87  12.71 4.43 69  14.10 3.14 37  13.54 3.15 52  14.33 2.78 92 
Political Upward 
Influence 15.16 4.14 87  13.26 4.13 69  14.57 4.69 37  12.90 2.86 52  15.29 4.34 92 
A. n = 337 
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Hypothesis 1 proposed that subordinate perceptions of participation in decision making 
would significantly affect their selection of upward influence tactics. Results of the 
MANOVA analysis revealed a significant main effect for participation in decision making 
(Mult. F = 6.43, df = 4,306, p < .000, R2 = .08). Examination of the univariate ANOVA results 
revealed significant main effects for open upward influence (F = 19.41, df = 1,309, p < .00, 
eta2 = .06) and strategic upward influence-B (F = 17.97, df = 1,309, p < .00, eta2 = .05). As the 
means in Table 3 suggest, those individuals in the high participation group reported using 
significantly more open upward influence and strategic upward influence-B than did those 
in the low participation group. 
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations for Use of Upward Influence Message Types by PDM Group 
Participation in Decision MakingA 
 High  Low 
Message Types Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n) 
Open Upward Influence 34.54 4.40 150  30.95 6.60 186 
Strategic Upward Influence-A 13.93 3.77 150  13.34 4.20 186 
Strategic Upward Influence-B 15.44 2.94 150  13.45 3.67 186 
Political Upward Influence 14.54 4.35 150  14.19 3.93 186 
A. n = 336 
 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that subordinates’ perceptions of leader-member exchange 
would significantly affect their selection of upward influence tactics. Results of the 
MANOVA analysis revealed a significant main effect for leader-member exchange (Mult. 
F = 2.50, df = 4,306, p < .04, R2 = .03). Examination of the univariate ANOVA results revealed 
significant main effects for open upward influence (F = 6.47, df = 1,309, p < .01, eta2 = .02) 
and political upward influence (F = 4.22, df = 1,309, p < .04, eta2 = .01). As the means in 
Table 4 suggest, those individuals who perceive an in-group supervisory relationship se-
lect open upward influence significantly more often, and political upward influence sig-
nificantly less often than do those who perceive an out-group supervisory relationship. 
 
Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Use of Upward Influence Message Types by LMX Group 
Leader-Member ExchangeA 
 In-group  Out-group 
Message Types Mean SD (n)  Mean SD (n) 
Open Upward Influence 33.84 4.94 166  30.95 6.48 164 
Strategic Upward Influence-A 13.52 3.66 166  13.87 4.30 164 
Strategic Upward Influence-B 15.04 3.08 166  13.73 3.83 164 
Political Upward Influence 13.99 3.88 166  14.93 4.47 164 
A. n = 330 
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Discussion 
 
The results of this research demonstrate that centralization of authority, leader-member 
relationship, and organizational membership all significantly affect subordinates’ upward 
influence tactic choices. Subordinates who participate in decision making to a greater ex-
tent select significantly more open upward influence and strategic upward influence-b. In 
legitimating upward influence attempts, decentralized decision making appears to pro-
mote the use of open, information-based tactics as well as those that reflect sensitivity to a 
supervisor’s point of view. The results of this study do not support the possibility that low 
participation subordinates select more political upward influence tactics in order to be 
heard. A lack of opportunity to participate in organizational decision making does not ap-
pear to drive subordinates “underground.” Instead, the use of strategic upward influence-
A and political upward influence is fairly low and constant across both centralization con-
ditions. That low participation subordinates also are not selecting significantly more indi-
rect or covert upward influence tactics, suggests that they are generally less active than 
high participation subordinates in attempting influence. The results of this study com-
bined with others (Harrison, 1985) suggest that participation in decision making can affect 
related communication habits. Failing to provide legitimate avenues for worker participa-
tion in decision making can suppress the overall amount of upward influence activity as 
well as the range of tactic types chosen. 
The results of this study reveal that subordinates’ perceptions of leader-member ex-
change also affect their selection of upward influence tactics. That in-group subordinates 
report an increase in arguing openly for their ideas and opinions is consistent with the 
results of Fairhurst and Chandler (1989). Believing that their supervisors are essentially 
“on their side,” in-group subordinates may self-edit less, express their viewpoints more 
freely, and feel less compelled to protect themselves from potentially nonsupportive or 
retaliatory responses. The fact that out-group subordinates report using significantly more 
political upward influence may be related to the increased use of unilateral, downward 
influence by supervisors with out-group subordinates. In yielding more often to supervi-
sory directives, out-group subordinates may experience less success arguing openly for 
their ideas. They may choose to supplement their obvious influence attempts with covert 
action such as avoiding talking to a supervisor, simply proceeding with some preferred 
course of action, or maneuvering behind a supervisor’s back to obtain desired outcomes. 
While the use of covert upward influence could possibly jeopardize in-group supervisory 
relationships (i.e., a supervisor could detect a subordinate’s deception and respond nega-
tively), their use within out-group relationships may be less risky since subordinates 
would have less to lose if caught in their deception. 
While centralization and the quality of supervisory relationship both significantly affect 
the selection of upward influence tactics, organizational membership affects the selection 
of all four tactic types (rather than just one or two) and also explains the greatest amount 
of variance in the upward influence measures. Thus, there may be something particularly 
important about organizational membership as a source of variation in influence activity. 
Through organizational socialization and individualization processes Oablin & Krone, 
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1987), subordinates may learn to enact locally appropriate and effective influence behav-
iors. And what constitutes appropriate and effective upward influence may vary some-
what from one organization to the next. That organizational membership is a significant 
predictor of upward influence tactic choice also supports those who argue that “the people 
make the place” (Schneider, 1987) as well as the structurationist suggestion that there is 
something a little unique about every organization (Poole, 1988). 
Finally, the calculation of average item scores reveals that in general, open upward in-
fluence was selected most frequently, followed by strategic upward influence-b, strategic 
upward influence-a and political upward influence. Open upward influence may be se-
lected most frequently because it requires less rhetorical finesse than does strategic up-
ward influence-a or -b. Behaviors such as presenting two-sided arguments, assessing what 
is important to a supervisor and appealing to those attitudes and values during upward 
influence attempts require more persuasive skill than the use of information-based influ-
ence tactics. Also, the use of open upward influence involves less risk than the use of po-
litical upward influence. In selecting political tactics, subordinates actively deceive their 
supervisors in the course of attempting influence. While the use of these tactics may in fact 
help subordinates accomplish work-related goals, if detected their use could also jeopard-
ize a trusting supervisory relationship (e.g., Bok, 1978). 
While there are clear patterns in how organizational membership, centralization, and 
leader-member relationship affect upward influence, it also is important to note the limi-
tations of this study. First, the data collection procedures employed are subject to the stand-
ard criticisms leveled against the use of all strategy checklist approaches (see Seibold, 
Cantrill & Meyers, 1985 for a review). In anticipation of some of these criticisms, a manip-
ulation check item was included to assess how typical respondents thought the tactics were 
of their everyday influence attempts. Respondents indicated that the list of influence tactics 
were moderately typical of the ones that they would use every day. Equally important 
however, are potential problems with the construct validity of the political model of com-
munication behavior extended and tested in this study. Although discussion with experi-
enced organizational members suggests that the model possesses face validity, the 
problems with the factor analysis call into question its construct validity. Obviously, it is 
very difficult to develop survey items that can capture the subtle differences between mes-
sages with open vs. closed means and ends. 
Despite these problems, this study detects patterns in what causes certain types of tac-
tics to be selected over others. Given the importance of effective subordinate influence to 
organizations and their members, organizational leaders should be sensitive to situational 
sources of variability in influence tactic choice. They should be aware that within a single 
organization, informal “rules” or the general climate may mitigate against upward influ-
ence attempts or attempts using specific types of tactics. In addition, organizational leaders 
could be more devoted to ensuring that subordinates receive adequate training in how to 
assess situational features, make appropriate and effective tactic choices, and enact the 
necessary behaviors to increase their likelihood of being heard. Finally, while it is sensible 
to assume that organizational features such as the ones explored in this study affect tactic 
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selection because they also affect subordinates’ perceptions of tactic availability, appropri-
ateness and effectiveness, this assumption remains to be explicitly examined in future re-
search. 
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